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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a statistical test to assess the adequacy
of static equilibrium models. The test is based on a restricted
cost function framework together with the envelope conditions which
characterize static equilibrium for the quasi—fixed factors. We
also show how restricted cost function models can be exploited to
investigate some important issues such as the calculation of the
rates of return to quasi—fixed factors, the determination of over-
or underinvestmerit in particular assets, and the distinction
between short run excess capacity and long run economies of scale.
We provide an empirical application of these techniques to data on
the Bell System for the period 1947—1976, treating the stocks of
physical capital and of research and development (R&D) as quasi-
fixed inputs. The results suggest thattherewas substantial
overinvestment in capital and underinvestment in R&D compared to the
static equilibrium levels, and that the rates of return to capital
and R&D were about 4.5 and 10-15 percent, respectively.
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A number of papers have appeared recently on the specification and
estimation of dynamic equilibrium models of factor demand and their
application to the explanation of productivity growth.1 These papers
representa significant departure from earlier empirical work in this
area, which was based on static equilibrium models and dynamic models
with ad hoc adjustment mechanisms. The dynamic equilibriummodels begin
withthe theory of restricted cost functions, in which the firm minimizes
thecosts of production over a set of completely variable inputs condi-
tional on a given stock of quasi—fixed factors (hereafter, fixed factors).2
The assumption is made that the firm faces smooth, convex costs of
adjusting the stocks of fixed factors and an intertemporal cost minimization
problem is solved to obtain explicit time paths for the fixed inputs.
These models yield many useful insights, especially in terms of the
dynamic pattern of input substitution and complementarity, but they make
stringent demands on the available data and have some conceptual limitations.
The assumption of smooth convex adjustment costs rules out potentially
interesting asymmetries regarding the costs of investment and disinvestment.
Moreover, there may be various reasons for a divergence between the actual
level and static equilibrium level of fixed factors which cannot be
summarized adequately by smooth convex adjustment costs, such as regulatory
restrictions, credit rationing and other institutional rigidities. One
can embrace the idea of dynamic equilibrium models and yet maintain that
the particular formulation should reflect the problem under study.
An alternative approach which sidesteps these complications is to
use a restricted cost (or profit) function framework but leave the levels
1of the fixed factors unexplained. These restricted equilibrium models
are more flexible in that they do not impose a particular structure on
the evolution of fixed factors, but for the same reason they yield no
information about dynamic substitution possibilities or the time path of
fixed inputs. This approach has been applied widely to analyze the short
and long run structure (but not the dynamic path) of factor demand and
costs (see papers in Berndt and Field 1981; also Lau and Yotopolous 1971),
to study productivity growth (Caves, Christensen and Swanson 1981), and to
estimate the divergence between the observed and static equilibrium levels
of the fixed inputs (Brown and Christensen 1981). In a recent important
paper, Berndt and Fuss (1982) show explicitly how measured growthin total
factor productivity reflects both shifts in the production possibility
frontier and any existing divergences of the fixed inputs f rpm their
static equilibrium levels, and they demonstrate that the correct adjustment
for this problem requires information on the shadow prices of the fixed
inputs. Given the focus of many of these studies, it is a natural
extension and would be very useful to develop an empirical test of the
divergence of fixed inputs from the static equilibrium levels and a
method to estimate their shadow prices directly. Unfortunately, such a
test is not yet available in the literature.
The first objective of this paper is to provide a usable empirical
test of the hypothesis that fixed inputs are at their static equilibrium
levels. In a restricted cost function framework, the static equilibrium
level of a fixed factor is defined by the well—known envelope condition
which equates the marginal savings in variable costs and the market rental
price of the fixed input (Samuelson 1953; Corinan 1968). We formulate a
2statistical test of whether the envelope conditions are validated by
the data. The test procedure should assist the empirical researcher in
choosing between the static, restricted and dynamic equilibrium modelling
strategies. We also show how to retrieve information about the long run
structure of costs andinputsubstitution from the restricted cost
function. The second objective is to provide a method of estimating the
marginal rates of return to the fixed inputs from a restricted cost
function. Aside from their intrinsic interest, we suggest how estimates
of the rates of return (or the shadow prices to which they are related)
can be used to implement the proposal by Berndt and Fuss (1982) to
adjust measured productivity growth for departures of fixed factors from
their static equilibrium levels.
Finally, we provide an empirical application of these procedures
to data on the Bell System for the period 1947—1976, in which the stocks
of physical capital and of research and development (R&D) are treated as
fixed inputs. Summarizing briefly, the empirical results indicate that
the hypothesis of static equilibrium can be rejected strongly for capital
and (more ambiguously) for R&D, that there was excessive investment in
capital and underinvestment in R&D compared to the static equilibrium
levels, and that the marginal rates of return to capital and R&D were on
the order of 4.5 and 10—15 percent, respectively.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 sets out the restricted
cost function framework and shows how to retrieve characteristics of the
underlying long run technology. The procedure for testing the envelope
conditions is developed in Section 2. The method of estimating the rates
of return to fixed inputs is presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides
3an empirical application of the model to the Bell System. Concluding
remarks follow.
1. Methodological Framework
Let T(y,x,z) =0denote the underlying transformation function
connecting the level of output y, a set of variable Inputs x= (x1,. ..
anda set of fixed inputs z =(z1,...
,z). If T(.) satisfies certain
regularity conditions (Lau 1976) and the firm minimizes the variable costs
of producing y, conditional on the vector z and fixed prices for variable
inputs p, there exists a restricted (or variable) cost function
(1) 'YC =F(y,p;z).
The function F(y,p;z) is monotonically nondecreasing and concave in p,
nondecreasing in y, and nonincreasing and convex in z.By Hotelling's
Lemma the set of conditional demand functions for the variable factors is
obtained by differentiating F(.) with respect to variable input prices:
(2) x =F(y,p;z)
where a subscript denotes partial differentiation so F (F ,...,F).
p p1
The associated short run cost function includes the costs of fixed
factors:
(3) SC =F(y,p;z)+rz'
where a prime denotes a transpose of a vector, and r =(r1,.
..,r)is a
vector of market rental (service) prices of the fixed inputs.
4The preceding functions are defined forrarbitrary positive levels of
*
z. The static equilibrium levels of z, z ,aredefined implicitly by the
envelope conditions (Sainuelson 1953; Gorman 1968):
(4) —F(y,p;z*) =r
The left hand side of (4) represents the marginal reduction in variable
costs due to z, or the shadow price of z. The envelope condition says
that fixed factors are at the static equilibrium levels if and only if
their shadow prices equal the market rental prices. Also note for future
reference that (3) and (4) imply that 3SC/z =0if and only if the
envelope condition for Zj holds, i.e., Zj =Z..Finally, let z =H(y,p,r)
denote the demand functions for z implied by (4) and substitute into (3)
to obtain the long run cost function
(5) C =F(y,p,H(y,p,r))+ rH'(y,p,r) =G(y,p,r)
where the prime represents a transpose of the vector.
The duality theorems which link transformation and restricted cost
functions guarantee that the structure of production can be inferred from
the restricted equilibrium framework (see for example Lau 1976). The
structure of production is summarized by the long run output elasticity
of costs and the partial elasticities of substitution, and we now show
how to derive these measures from the restricted cost function.
Let n = lnVC/ lny and = lnSC/ my denote the output elasticity
of variable and short run (total) costs, respectively. Differentiating
(2) with respect to output and letting z vary arbitrarily, we obtain
(6) SC =F+ F z' + rZ'
y yzy y
5To allow for inoptimal choice of z, let —F =r+ d where d (d ,... ,d) z 1 n
denotes the deviations of the shadow prices from the market rental prices
of z. Using this notation and converting (6) to elasticities we obtain
(7) n (1 + ir)1[n
—ITfl' s vdzy
where ir (1 + rz'/vc), —dz'/'I.rCand n =a lnz/alny. Therefore, the
short run (total) cost elasticity reflects the variable cost elasticity.
the divergence of fixed inputs from their static equilibrium levels, and
the response of those inputs to changes in the level of output. If static
*
equilibriumholds, z =zand d =0,short and long run costs coincide,




whereiiandn are evaluated at z =z.Asnoted by Hanoch (1975), the
proper measure of scale economies is given by n. It is important to
note that the long run cost elasticity can be retrieved from the variable
cost elasticity only in the neighborhood of the static equilibrium levels
* offixed factors. That is, equation (8) holds only at z =zand
inferences based on (8) are invalid if z z. This finding contrasts
with Caves, Christensen and Swanson (1981) who claim to show that the
long run scale economies can be retrieved at any arbitrary level of z.3
The analysis also illustrates the classic problem of disentangling
the effects of "excess capacity" and economies of scale (Borts 1960).
Note from (7) and (8) that
* *_1 * —1 1+ir —= (1+ —n)
+ (1 + ri)nv
+ C+.)
6Assume for simplicity that the restricted cost function is homogeneous in
output, so n is a constant and Suppose that excess stocks of
fixed factors are held (i.e., z >z,which implies d >0and d > and
that those inputs are normal (n>0).Then it follows from (9) that
>n.In this case, incorrectly using observed (short run) data on z
and equation (8) to infern would yield an underestimate of the true
and hence an overstatement of returns to scale. The contrary holds if
z <z.The correct procedure to infernL from is either to test the
hypothesis zz and then (conditional on nonrejection) evaluate (8) at
* theobserved z, or to estimate z as those values which solve the envelope
conditions and use them to evaluate equation (8). We return to this point
later.
Consider now the Allen partial elasticities of substitution (AES).
We limit the technical derivation to a brief summary and provide the
intuition behind the results. A complete technical derivation is presented
in Brown and Christensen (1981). Let and denote the variable
and long run AES between inputs i and j, and zk =Hk(ypr)be the demand
function for implied by the envelope conditions (3). The AES can be
expressed in terms of the restricted and total cost functions as (Uzawa
1962):
(lOa) =FF../F.F. V13 13
(lOb) =GG./G.G i iJ ii
where F(.) and G(.) are the restricted and long run cost functions given
in (1) and (5), superscripts denote inputs, and subscripts denote partial
derivatives with respect to input prices unless otherwise noted. Of
7ii course, ois defined only for variable inputs since fixed factors are
given in the short run. For clarity we partition inputs into a Bet of
variable factors (VF) and a set of fixed factors (FF), with associated
indices i,jVF and k,inE.FF.
The expressions for the are obtained by taking the derivations
required in (lOb) and using the envelope conditions (4) to simplify them.
The procedure is straightforward, except perhaps to note that in
differentiating G(y,p,r) with respect to prices of fixed inputs the
dependence of z on those prices, as shown in (5), must be recognized.





where F.k is the cross partial of F() with respect to p. and
Equations (ha—he) provide the long runAES betweenvariable factors,
between variable and fixed factors, and between fixed factors, respectively.
Using (lOa) we can also write (ha) as =(1+ lr*)[cj3 + F(FkhI)/FlFJ
*
wherer was defined earlier. This form of the long run AES allows a
simple intuitive interpretation. The consists of a direct and an
indirect effect of p. on x.. The term represents the direct effect,
1 3 V
holdingz constant in the short run. The second group of terms in the
brackets represents the indirect effect of p on Xjviathe effect of
on the optimal levels of the fixed factorsk. To see this, recall that
8and note that by Shephard's Lemma Fjzk = Hence,
jzkHj —(xj/api)azk/apj
is the indirect effect of P onXj through
the induced changes in the z's. Of course, in (llb) and (lic) = o
by the definition of fixed factors, and only the indirect effect remains.
To evaluate the O'B empirically, one requires the derivatives of
the restricted cost function F() and of the long run demands for the
fixed factors Hk(.) which appear in (ila—lic). The latter can be
expressed in terms of the derivatives of F(.) by performing comparative
statics on the system of envelope conditions given in (4) (see Brown and
Christensen 1981 for details). It is important to emphasize that the
derivation of (ila—lic) uses the envelope conditions, and hence these
*
formulas are valid only for z =z.Thispoint also applies to the long
run cost elasticity, as we noted. There are two approaches to this
*
problem. The first is to estimate the z as those values which solve the
system of envelope conditions (4), given the data on y, p and r and the
parameter estimates of the restricted cost function, and then to evaluate
(ha—lie) at the estimated z*(Brown and Christensen 1981). One limitation
of this approach is that it is not possible to determine whether the
*
divergence between the estimated z and the observed z is statistically
*
significant or simply reflects sampling error in the estimated z .An
alternative approach which we propose is to test the hypothesis that
z =z.If the hypothesis is not rejected, then (ha—lie) can be
evaluated at the observed levels of z. If the hypothesis is rejected,
*
the evidence supports a significant divergence between z and z and the
first approach must be used. In the next section we develop such a test.
92. A Test of Static Equilibrium
The test Is conducted under the null hypothesis (H0) that the static
equilibrium levels of fixed factors are held. Under H0 the fully specified
model consists of the restricted cost function, the conditional demands
for the variable inputs, and the long run demands for fixed factors. That




(12b) x =F(y,p,z;B1) + C2
(12c) z =H(y,p,r;3)+ £3
where the cs are stochastic disturbances which reflect randOm optimization
and other errors and which in general are correlated across equations, and
the 's are parameter vectors. The validity of the restricted equilibrium
framework (for arbitrary z) is a maintained hypothesis. This implies that
that is the vector which parametrizes (12b) is a subset of
in (12a). These cross—equation parameter constraints are maintainedhere.4
Also note that 11oallowsfor random error in the determination of the
static equilibrium levels of z. This seems distinctly preferable to the
*
morerestrictive and less realistic hypothesis that z =zexactly. It
will turn out that the test of H0 which we propose is equivalent to the
Hausman test for misspecification applied to the system of simultaneous
equations (12a—12c) (Hausman 1978). Since this is by no means obvious,
we now discuss the intuition behind the test and then present It formally.
10The substantive implication of H0is that B2c80, since (12c) is
derived from (12a) by using the envelope conditions. Partition the vector
Bo as B (B,8) where the elements of appear in (12a) but not in
(12c) under Then H0 implies the restrictions B23. The st
direct test of H0 is a standard likelihood ratio test of B2 =3.Let B
be the asymptotically efficient, constrained estimator offrom (12a—12c)
under the restrictions B2 = andbe the unconstrained estimator from
(12a—12c), where bothandtake account of the cross—equation correlation
among the stochastic disturbances. The standard test is based on a
comparison of the values of the likelihood function underand B. In
order for this test to be valid, B must be a consistent estimator of 8
under H but inconsistent under H1, whilemust be consistent under both
H0 and H1. This requirement is met only under a rather narrow class of
alternative hypotheses, in particular that under H1 the observed z are
some arbitrary function of only y, p and r. In this case (12c) remains
properly specified under H1, but with 82 3&3.This specification of H1
is too narrow, however, because almost any dynamic specification of the
determination of z will yield demand functions for z which depend on
additional variables beside y, p and r. Under a broader formulation of
H1, however, the standard test breaks down because then (12c) is
misspecif led under H1 and the unconstrained estimator is inconsistent.
The inconsistency arises because the misspecification in (12c) is
transmitted to B through the covariance in the 's used to construct .
Avalid test can be developed by recognizing that, regardless of how z
is determined under H, the system (12a—12b) remains properly specified
since it holds for arbitrary z. Hence, we propose to test H0 by comparing
11the asymptotically efficient, constrained-estimator from (12a—12c) under
the restrictions —8,,toanother estimator obtained from (12a—12b),
13.As required for a valid test,is consistent under H0 but not under
(the more general) whileis a consistent estimator under both H0
and H1.
The test procedure can be formalized as follows. Suppose that
(12a—12c) can be expressed as linear equations in the parameters. Write
(12a—12b) in stacked matrix form:
(13) Y=X13+U
where Y is an (in+1)T x 1 vector consisting of T observations on variable
cost followed by those on the m variable factors, X is an (in + 1)T x k
matrix on y, p and z (k in number), 13 is a (k x 1) parameter vector, and
U is an (in + 1)T x 1 vector of disturbances with E(U) =0and E(UU') =I0
where I is a T x T identity matrix. Let the system augmented by (12c) be
-Y Ix1 -U
=
Lxi — z —
or
(14)
where z is an nT x 1 vector of observations on the n fixed factors, X
is an nT x k matrix on y, p and r, and c is an nT x 1 vector of disturbances
with E(c) =0,E(cc') =I0 ,andE(eU') =I0 i.Finally,let E(t') =
I0 L, where Z =L
12Since z--is-endogenous under H0 and appears inX and X, instrumental
variable (IV) estimators are required. Let P and P be conformable
matrices of suitable instruments for X and X (such that P'(I 0')X and
P'(I 0 are square and nonsingular). The generalized covariance IV
estimators of 8from(13) and (14) are
(15) =[P'(I8 '1)X]1P'(I 0
=8+[P'(I 0 Z 1)X] 'P'(I 0
and
(16) =[P'(I0 E 1)X] P'(I 6 E1)Y
=8+ [P'(I 0 Z 1)X]_1P'(I 0
It follows that v'f ( —)N(0,V) and V ( —)N(0,V1) where
means asymptotically distributed, V0 =plim[P'(I6 1 )X/T]
1and
V1 =plim[P'(I8 1)X/T}. From (15) and (16)
(17) —= [P'(I8 1)X]'P'(I 0
—['(I8 I)]'(I 6





V be any consistent estimator of V. Then we obtain the test statistic
N =T(—)91(— x where q Is the number of restrictions being
tested (i.e., embodied in 82 =82).
To test the null hypothesis that all fixed factors are at their
static equilibrium levels, the computed test statistic M is compared to
the critical value of the Chi—square deviate with q degrees of freedom.
13The procedure can also.be used to test the hypothesis that only a subset
of fixed inputs are at their optimal levels, leaving the others free to
be at arbitrary levels. In this case the estimatoris defined as
before, but B is obtained from (12a—12b) plus the subset of (12c)
corresponding to the fixed factors to be tested. Finally, It may be
recognized that the test procedure provided here is equivalent to a
Hausman test for specification error In a system of simultaneous equations
(Hausman 1978). Hence, the existing literature on the power of the liausman
test is relevant here (e.g., Hausman 1978; Holly 1982).
3. Rate of Return to Quasi—Fixed Factors
In this section we show how to derive estimates of the Internal
rates of return (IRR) to fixed factors from the restricted equilibrium
framework.One preliminary point is in order. As noted in Section 1,
the restricted cost function must be convex in z, and one of the
implications of this condition is that the long run demand functions for
z are downward sloping (i.e., the shadow price —F declines with z).
Recall that the static equilibrium level of z, z ,isdetermined by
equalizing the shadow price and the opportunity cost of funds. Since
(as we show below) the shadow price is directly related to the IRR, it
follows that a divergence between the IRR at the observed z and the
opportunity cost of funds is a reflection of a divergence between the
observed and static equilibrium levels of z. In fact the two problems
can be viewed as the duals of each other. As a consequence It Is
meaningful to estimate the IRR only if a statistically significant
*
divergencebetween z and z has been established. Therefore, the test
14of static equilibrium proposed in Section 2 should be conducted prior to
the computation of the IRR to fixed factors.
In the present framework investments in z shift the restricted (or
variable) cost curve downward and establish a new long run equilibrium
price for output. The market price, however, may adjust with some lag.
In each period the gross private returns to the investment ae the
difference between total revenue and the new level of short run costs,
evaluated at the prevailing short run equilibrium. These rents arise
from the firm's temporary monopoly power resulting from the cost
reduction or, equivalently, the sluggishness of price adjustment. The size
of these rents depends both on the level of the new equilibrium price and
the speed of adjustment toward it, and hence varies with the specific
market structure under consideration. In this section and in the
subsequent empirical application we analyze the case of a regulated,
single product monopoly. (The modification for an unregulated competitive
firm will be noted later.) No assumption is made regarding the degree of
returns to scale. The firm is constrained to earn zero economic profits
eventually. That is, the regulatory authorities fix the price of output
at the intersection of the demand and average total cost curves, possibly
with some lag, and the firm is required to meet demand at that price.
The measure of average total cost used by the regulators for price
determination includes a remuneration to the surviving (i.e., undepreciated)
stock of fixed inputs. While in practice the determination of this
"allowed return" is a complicated procedure, we assume that it reflects
the opportunity cost of funds, or the market rental price of the fixed
factors.
15Suppose the firm makes an investment in z which lowers both the
average variable and average total cost curves. If there is no regulatory
lag, the price of output adjustB immediately to the new level of average
total cost and the investment earns only the market rental price which is
reflected in that cost. However, if there is any regulatory lag in
adjusting the price, the firmalsoenjoys some rents and the total private
return to the investment exceeds its opportunity cost.6 Other things
equal, the realized private returns vary directly with the length of the
regulatory lag. Since static equilibrium requires that the marginal
investtnent in z earn only the normal rate of return, the question which
arises is whether (and under what condition) there can be an equilibrium
level of z in the presence of regulatory lag. This can occur only if the
marginal investment in z does not shift the total cost curve since in this
case the equilibrium price of output remains unchanged, there are no
realized rents to the investment and the effect of regulatory lag is
thereby neutralized. This condition holds if and only If the reduction
in variable costs just equals the market rental price of z, hich is
exactly the familiar envelope condition (equation (4) above). We conclude
that in this regulated environxnent with sluggish price adjustment the
static equilibrium level of z, z, is defined by the standard envelope
*
condition.This conclusion does not imply that z is independent of
*
regulatorylag. The length of regulatory lag affects z through its
impact on the rents which accrue to investment in z. For example, a
slower price adjustment generates larger private returns to such
*
investmentand hence a larger equilibrium stock of fixed factors z
16We have argued that the private benefits from an investment in the
stock of fixed input z consists of a stream of rents over time due to
regulatory lag in adjusting the output price, plus the market rental
price paid each period to the surviving stock z. The rents which accrue
each period are the difference between the prevailing output price and
the new level of average total cost, multiplied by the level of output.
The time path of private returns is determined by three parameters. The
first is the rate of growth of demand for output. Given the exogenously
set price, the level of output and hence the size of the rents depend on
the level of demand. The second is the rate of price adjustment toward
the new, lower level of average cost. The third factor is somewhat more
subtle. A unit of investment today raises by one unit the current stock
of z. This stock represents the productive capacity of the cumulated
pastinvestments in z and it is this "surviving" stock which appears in
the restricted cost function. In general there will be some decay in
theproductive capacity of an investment as it ages, which we refer to
as the rate of deterioration. Therefore, an investment today raises the
surviving stock of z by a diminishing amount over time, or put another
way, it reduces the average total cost by an amount which erodes over
time as deterioration sets in. This rate of deterioration affects the
private returns in two ways. First, it shrinks the realized rents which
accrue to the initial investment. Second, it reduces the effective
remuneration for the opportunity cost of funds, since that compensation
is paid on the basis of the surviving stock of z.
On the basis of the preceding discussion we can formalize the
derivation of the IRR as follows. Define the average total cost function
17(18) C —(y,p,z)+ rz'
where a bar denotes normalization by the level of output, F() is the
restricted cost function, and r is a vector of market rental prices for
z. Note that C/z may be positive or negative and it will equal zero
only if the envelope conditions hold (see Section 1).
Consider a unit investment in a particular quasi—fixed factor z
(we omit the identifying subscript for simplicity). The marginal net




where 0 is the gestation lag between the investment and its impact on
F(s) (assumed to be a fixed rather than a distributed lag, for simplicity),
and Bt denotes the gross private returns at time t from the investment.
Assume that the demand for output grows at rate g. Let ó be the rate of
adjustment of the output price toward the new level of average cost and
be the rate of deterioration. Then
(20) B =(P
—C)y0et+ ret
where the first term represents the rents accruing at time t and the
second is the normal remuneration to the surviving piece of the investment.







definition =+C0/3z, and from the argument aboutdeterioration
=(0/z0)et.
Substituting these relations into (20) and
notingC0 =C0y0,
we obtain
18(21) ——/ )(_6_4))t+ ret.
Using (18) and (21) in (19) and performing the integration (assuming
6 + 4)> g),we can write the IRR, p, in the following implicit form:
(22) e6(p+ 6+ 4)- g) - r(+-
Weknow from the earlier discussion that when the envelope
condition holds the investment earns only the opportunity cost of funds.
Then the net rate of return is equal to the (appropriate) market rate
of interest, 1. In other words, p =iwhen aC0/az0 =0.Using this
condition and (18) in (22), we can solve for the market rental. price, r.
This yields:
(23) r =e01(i+ 4).
Equation(23)defines the appropriate market rental price for z to be
used in the empirical work when the envelope conditions are imposed
(neglecting tax parameters). Substituting it back into (22) we obtain
(24) eOP(p + 6 + 4)- g)-e01(6-g)(1 )= -
Equation(24) is the nonlinear equation which implicitly defines the IRR,
p, given the values for the other parameters. The term —F0/z0
represents the shadow price of z, evaluated at the observed (not the
static equilibrium) level of z. It is retrieved from the estimated
restricted cost function (i.e., using the system of equations (12a—12b)
in Section 2).
19The discussion to this point has been based on a regulated firm.
The derivation of the IRR for an unregulated competitive firm can be
viewed as a special case, if we are willing to maintain the assumption
that the level of output is exogenous to the firm. (Otherwise a decision
rule for the determination of output must be incorporated into the
analysis.) For the competitive firm the only source of private returns
to investments in z are the rents which arise from sluggish price
adjustment in the market. The second set of terms in (24) vanishes and
the equation for the IRR collapses to e(p + 6 + 4)— g)=
—F0/z0.
The term 6 + 4)— gcan be interpreted as the rate of obsolescence of the
value of the fixed asset, reflecting price adjustment 6, deterioration 4),
andthe capital gains due to market growth, g. An expression of this
7
form can be found in Pakes and Schankerman (1984).
As noted, the computation of the IRR requires an estimate of the
shadow price, —3F0/z0, which can be obtained from the estimated
restricted cost function. This shadow price may also be useful in
studying the growth in total factor productivity of firms or industries
in which static equilibrium is violated. In an important paper Berndt
and Fuss (1982) analyze the nonparametric measurement of productivity
in cases where fixed factors diverge from their static equilibrium levels.
They show that measures based on the market rental prices of fixed factors
confound under— or overutilization of those factors with true productivity
growth. They prove that the correct remedy is to use the (ex ante)
shadow prices in place of market rental prices for the fixed inputs, and
they suggest the use of Tobin's—q to approximate the expected shadow
price. Our framework delivers direct estimates of the shadow prices
20(though ex post ones) which could also be used to implement the Berndt—
Fuss proposal.8 This may be a particularly attractive alternative in
models with more thanonefixed factor, since it is not clear to us how
Tobin's—q can be used to identify the shadow prices of several fixed
inputs simultaneously.
4. An Empirical Application
In this section we provide an empirical application of the techniques
developed in Sections 1—3 to data on the Bell System for the period
1947—1976. We first briefly summarize the empirical framework and then
present and discuss the results.
The empirical work is based on a generalized Cobb—Douglas restricted
cost function. Letting lower case letters denote loragithms, the form
we use is
(25) vc —y=+czp1 + kZk +
k#i
Yk9kZP. + Ajp1z
where i,j =1,...,mdenote the variable inputs, k,P. =1,...,ndenote
fixed factors, and all variables are defined around some expansion point.
The form in (25) is a special case of the more general translog
specification, allowing only linear interactions among variable factor
prices and fixed inputs and imposing constant short run average cost.
The model we estimate is based on two variable inputs, labor and materials,
and two fixed inputs, the stocks of capital and of R&D. We experimented
with the full translog specification and found that it was seriously
overparametrized. The time series data used here cannot sustain such
complicated parametric specifications.9 Christensen, Cummings and
21Schoech (1980) used similar data and encountered the same difficulties in
a model with one fixed input, and the presence of two fixedfactors here
only exacerbates the problem.
Applying Shephard's Lemma to (25) yields the set of share equations
for variable inputs
(26) S1a1 + AjkZk
where S1 =P1X/VC
is the share of input i in variable cost. If in
addition the fixed factors are at their static equilibrium levels, the





is the ratio of the fixed cost for input k to variable
cost. Equations (27) hold only at the static equilibrium levelsof .Zk.
We impose the theoretical requirement of linear homogeneity in input
prices using the restrictions =1and 2ik =0.The symmetry
I i
restriction on and are also imposed. The formulation in (25)
imposes a unitary variable cost elasticity and elasticityof substitution
(AES) between variable inputs. The long run cost elasticity is given by
* * *
n =(1+¶ )whereit= andthe lTk'S are evaluated at the static
k
equilibrium levels of all variables. The long run AESareretrieved
using the procedure outlined in Section1.10
The basic model consists of (25) and (26). This corresponds to
(12a —12b)in Section 3 and makes no assumption about how fixed factors
22are determined. To conduct the tests of static equilibrium, we also
require that the envelope conditions (27) for the fixed factors being
tested be included. We specify jointly normal, additive disturbances
with contemporaneous correlation across equations. The equations are
estimated by iterated three stage least squares (3SLS), using a set of
instruments for the fixed factors.'1 One variable share equation is
dropped due to the normalization on shares, but the parameter estimates
are invariant to which equation is omitted. A diagonal specification
for first order autocorrelation is made in accordance with the requirements
of a singular system of equations (Berndt and Savin 1975).
We use annual data for the Bell System over the period 1947—1976.
The data are described in detail in Nadiri and Schankerman (1981a) and
only a brief suary is provided here.'2 The measure of aggregate output
is the sum of operating revenues for four service categories——local
service, intrastate toll, interstate toll, and a small miscellaneous
category. The operating revenues for each category are deflated by a
category—specific Paasche price index. The quantity of labor input is
the man hours actually worked adjusted for changes in the composition of
the work force. Man hours are classified into twenty—two categories
based on occupation and years of service and a composition adjustment is
made by weighting the man hours in each category by the relative wage
rates in the base year, 1967.(The data were not available to use varying
relative wage rates as weights.) An implicit price index for labor is
constructed as the ratio of total employee compensation to the quantity
of labor input. The materials input consists of six categories of
materials, rents and supplies, each separately deflated. An implicit
23price index for the materials input is then constructed.
The stock of capital Is the sum of net tangible plant, cash, net
accounts receivable and inventories. Tangible plant, which accounts for
the bulk of capital stock, is constructed from twenty—three categories
of capital, each identified by vintage, separately depreciated and
deflated using the Bell Telephone System Plant (Laspeyres) Indices. As
required by equation (23), the service price of capital is constructed as
the sum of the cost of investment funds and the rate of depreciation,
multiplied by an investment goods deflator and adjusted for various tax
parameters in the standard way.13
The stock of R&D is constructed as a geometrically weighted sum of
deflated non—military R&D expenditures by the Bell System, lagged for
years. The lag is designed to reflect the mean gestation period between
R&D expenditure and its impact on the level of variable costs. R&D flows
are deflated by the implicit GNP price index. The cumulation of R&D
flows is based on an assumed rate of deterioration of 0.05 (but the
empirical results are robust to alternative assumptions). The service
price of R&D is constructed as required by equation (23), multiplied by
the implicit GNP deflator. No adjustment for tax parameters is made
because R&D expenditures are treated for tax purposes by the company as
an operating expense rather than as a capital asset.
Table 1 presents the parameter estimates for the basic model. As
required by the theory, increases in the stocks of fixed factors reduce
the level of variable cost (k<0r<O)• The estimated restricted cost
function satisfies the theoretical requirements of monotonicity and
concavity in variable factor prices, and convexity in fixed factors, at
24every sample observation. The fits of the share equations are rather low,
but this is not surprising since these equations have been almost first—
differenced in the estimation (p —0.9).
Before turning to the implied characterization of the long run cost
function, we first must conduct the tests of static equilibrium for the
fixed factors using the procedure developed in Section 2. The test is
based on a comparison between the parameter estimates from (25) and (26),
and the estimates from (25), (26) and the subset of (27) which corresponds
to the fixed factors being tested. The procedure allows us to test capital
and R&D separately (leaving the other free) as well as jointly. Table 2
summarizes the results. The first row indicates strong rejection of
static equilibrium for capital. The computed test statistic of 17.8
greatly exceeds the critical value of 7.8 at the five percent level of
significance. By contrast, the second row shows that we cannot reject
the hypothesis of static equilibrium for R&D when it is tested separately.
liowever, the joint hypothesis that both capital and R&D are at their
static equilibrium values during the sample period is easily rejected.
There is of course no contradiction between these results for the
individual and joint hypothesis tests. It is worth noting, however, that
the nonrejection of static equilibrium for R&D is not robust. If we
specialize the restricted cost function in (25) to a Cobb Douglas form
and rerun the tests, we find that static equilibrium is rejected for both
R&D and capital, individually and jointly.
We can use the parameter estimates in Table 1 to solve for the
implied static equilibrium levels of capital and R&D, and then use these
values to retrieve characteristics of the long run cost function. Table 3














8 —.164 A .044 r mr
(.121) (.029)
R2,p,DWC
Cost Function =.94,0.8, 1.48
Labor Share =.12,0.9, 1.81
Materials Share =.12,0.9, 1.92
Notes
a
Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.
bNotethat =1—c,A=—A andA =—A
in L ink Lk mr Lr
C
P refers to the autocorrelation coefficient used to adjust the
equation.
26Table 2. Tests of Static Equilibrium for Fixed Factors
Quasi—Fixed Factor Ma d.f. Critical x205
Capital 17.8 3 7.8
R&D 6.1 3 7.8
Capital andR&D 32.9 6 12.6
a
The test statistic N (described in Section 2) distributes
asymptotically as a Chi—square deviate.








aNR —0.55, 0.13 0.55
—0.48, 0.28
a
The terms a, c and fl refer to the AES, own elasticities of
factor demand, and cost elasticity, respectively. Reported
values are those at the expansion point of the sample (1961)
but they are stable over time——except for o andc. These
estimates are trended; the first reported number is the
average over the period 1948—1961 and the second for 1962—
1976.
28presents the results. The AES Indicate considerable long run substitution
among inputs, except between R&D and materials and R&D and capital where the
estimates vary over time and are much smaller. The long run elasticities
of factor demand are negative, as required by theory. It is interesting
to note that the factor demands are price inelastic and similar across
inputs. The long run cost elasticity is estimated at 0.55, which implies
a scale elasticity of about 1.8. This is almost identical to the finding
in Nadiri and Schankerman (1981) but at the upper end of the range
reported in Christensen, Cummings and Schoech (1980).14
Table 4 summarizes information on the divergence between observed
levels of capital and R&D and the static equilibrium levels implied by
the estimated restricted cost function. The first two rows give the ratio
of observed to static equilibrium stocks of capital and R&D by subperiods.
The evidence suggests that the Bell System was substantially overcapitalized,
by between 21 and 50 percent depending on the subperiod. The extent of
overcapitalization increased sharply during the decade 1958—1967, which
interestingly is the period when the Bell System undertook large investment
programs in new technologies. This finding of overcapitalization is
consistent with the well—known Averch—Johnson effect of rate of return
regulation, for which there is some evidence in the literature (Courville
1974, Cowing 1978, and Spann 1974 on the electric utility industry). Other
interpretations are suggested later. In sharp contrast, Table 4 indicates
substantial underinvestment in R&D. The static equilibrium stock of R&D
is about three times as large s the observed one. This result may not
be as unreasonable as it first appears. The average observed R&D intensity
(R&D expenditure/total cost) for the Bell System during 1948—1976 was
29Table 4. Characteristics of the Divergence Between Observed and Static
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(C_C)/C* 0.048 0.073 0.117only .2.1 percent, which is less than half of the R&D intensity in other
technologically dynaxnicindustrles.such as Chemicals and Professional and
Scientific Instruments (National Science Foundation, annual). The static
equilibrium R&D intensity which we compute is about 7.3 percent, which
maybeplausible considering the scientific richness of the telecommuni-
cations field. Of course, in order to make a complete and validcomparison
other factors (such as the degree of vertical integration) must be taken
into account.
The third and fourth rows in Table 4 compare the shadow and market
rental prices for capital and R&D. As noted in Section 3, the differences
between shadow and market rental prices are the dual of the divergences
between observed and static equilibrium stocks of these assets.Following
Berndt and Fuss (1982), the shadow prices should be used for themeasurement
of total factor productivity. All of the available measurements of
productivity growth in the Bell System utilize market rental prices,
but the evidence in Table 4 suggests that this might yield quite inaccurate
results. Finally, Table 4 provides the percentage deviation of actual
total costs from the level which would occur if all factors were at their
static equilibrium levels. The latter Is evaluated by using equilibrium
stocks of capital and R&D, and the associated equilibrium levels of
variable factors which depend on those stocks. The results indicate that
"inoptimal" choice of capital and R&D raised total costs by about five to
ten percent over the sample period.
One important qualification is in order. The preceding evidence
does not imply that the Bell System's use of capital and R&D wasinoptimal
given the set of constraints it actually faced, but rather than the static
31equilibrium levels were not.held. The choice may well have been optimal
under a richer set of constraints such as rate of return regulation or
severe costs of adjustment. The only conclusion we draw at this stage
is that a static equilibrium representation of the Bell System is
inadequate.
The remaining task is to compute the net internal rates of return
to capital and R&D. These rates of return, p, are computed as the
solution to the nonlinear equation (see Section 3):
e0'(p+6 + 4)— g)—eOi(6—g)( + =0
whene 0 is the gestation lag, g is the expected rate of growth of output,
I Is the opportunity cost of funds, 4) the rate of deterioration, 6 is
the rate of output price adjustment, and 3F/az is the estimated shadow
price of the asset (evaluated at the expansion point, 1961, but the
results are robust). We use the following parameter values: i =.055,
g =.07,4) =.05,0 =0,2, 4 (years), and 6 =.25,.30, 3515 Since
the opportunity cost of funds is measured net of taxes, the computed rates
of return are after—tax.
Table 5 presents the results. The net rate of return to capital
is estimated at about 4.5 percent and is robust to variations in 0 and 6.
The fact that this rate of return is lower than the measured opportunity
cost of funds reflects the overcapitalization (relative to static
equilibrium) found earlier. The net rate of return to R&D Is markedly
higher, reflecting underinvestment in this input. The results are
reasonably robust to variations in 6 and 0, except in the case where
o =o.16Pakes and Schankerman (1984) conclude that 02 for




.25 .041 .041 .044
.30 .044 .045 .046
.35 .046 .047 .046
R&D
0 2 4
.25 .242 .150 .115
.30 .225 .138 .109
.35 .198 .128 .102
33manufacturing industries and this probably understates the gestation lag
for telecommunications reBearch. Therefore, we conclude from Table 5 that
the net rate of return to R&D in the Bell System is between 10 and 15
percent.
Concluding Remarks
In the literature two methodologies are used to estimate the
structure of production and factor demand equations. One is the static
equilibrium approach, which treats all factors of production as variable
and assumes away the problem of costs of adjustment. The other are
dynamic equilibrium models which are based on the theory of restricted
cost functions and arbitrarily assign costs of adjustment to certain
inputs. What is missing from the literature is an analytic approach to
testing statistically which class of models is appropriate for the
analysis of a given set of data. The main contribution of this paper
is to provide a statistical test to assess the adequacy of the static
equilibrium model, which should be used prior to specifying a fully
dynamic equilibrium model. We also show how restricted cost function
models can be exploited to investigate some important issues such as the
calculation of the rates of return to fixed factors, the determination of
over— orunderinvestment in particular assets, and the distinction
between short run excess capacity and long run economies of scale.
The specific contributions of the paper may be summarized briefly.
First, a restricted cost function framework is specified and it is shown
how to derive expressions for the long run cost elasticity and elasticities
of substitution. Second, a statistical test of static equilibrium is
34formulated by using the restricted equilibrium model in conjunction with
the envelope conditions which characterize static equilibrium for the
fixed factors. Our test procedure is equivalent to a Hausxnan test for
specification error in a system of simultaneous equations. Third, we
provide a method of computing the internal rates of return to fixed
factors and show how these rates of return depend on the shadow prices
of fixed factors, the growth of demand for output, the rate of price
adjustment, and the rate of deterioration of the stocks of fixed factors.
We also show that a divergence between the rate of return (at the observed
level of fixed factors) and the opportunity cost of funds is the dual
of the divergence between the observed and static equilibrium levels of
fixed factors. The methodology also provides direct estimates of the
shadow price of fixed inputs which can be used to adjust measured
productivity growth in cases where fixed factors diverge from their
static equilibrium levels.
To illustrate our methodology we have used data for the Bell System
for the period 1947—1976 to estimate a generalized Cobb—Douglas restricted
cost function with capital and R&D treated as fixed factors. The
empirical results indicate substantial long run economies of scale and
substitution among most of the inputs. The hypothesis of static
equilibrium Is rejected strongly for capital and (with qualification)
for R&D. The evidence Indicates that the Bell System was substantially
overcapitalized, particularly during 1958—1967 when it undertook large
investment programs in new technologies. However, there is evidence of
substantial underinvestment in R&D for the Bell System. The results
also suggest substantial divergence between the shadow and market rental
35prices for capital and R&D,—which reflects—the divergence -between the observed
and optimal levels of fixed factors. The same picture emerges when the
rates of return are considered. The net rates of return to capital and
R&D are 4.5 percent and 10—15 percent respectively, compared to an
opportunity cost of funds of about 5.5 percent. The "inoptimal" choice
of fixed factors raised total costs by five to ten percent over the static
equilibrium level.
The approach proposed in this paper is applicable to other areas
of economics and is not confined to empirical studies of production and
cost functions. It provides a procedure for researchers to examine whether
static equilibrium models are satisfactory or whether a fully dynamic
equilibrium model is warranted, and it suggests a number of issues which
can be explored prior to estimation of dynamic models.
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1. The relevant literature is quite extensive. Leading examples
include Morrison and Berndt (1981), Denny, Fuss and Waverman (1981), and
Epstein and Denny (1983). For a partial review of the literature see
Berndt, Morrison and Watkins (1981).
2. Restricted cost functions fall under the tre general heading
of restricted profit functions, of which they are a special case. See
Lau (1976).
3. Caves, Christensen and Swanson (CCS) show that the degree of
returns to scale, RTS, can be expressed as RTS =(1—a1nVC/alnz)n.
At z =zthis reduces to equation (8) (where RTS =n),butin general
it implies that the degree of long run scale economies can be retrieved
from the restricted cost function at arbitrary levels of z. The equation
derived by CCS is correct. The problem with their analysis is that RTS
is not the correct measure of scale economies in general. The concept
of RTS Is based on equiproportional increases in all inputs, including z.
As Hanoch (1975) showed, the correct concept of scale economies is
measured along the expansion path. The two concepts are the same only if
the production structure is homothetic, in which case the expansion path
is linear and equiproportional expansion of all inputs corresponds to
37long run cost minimizing behavior. That is, the envelope conditions are
*
assumedimplicitly to hold, and zz .Therefore,the only case when RTS
is the correct measure of scale economies corresponds to the case where
*
z z .Ifthe technology is not -honiothetic, the CCS measure of RTS is
equivalent to the reciprocal of the short run cost elasticity. To show
this, suppose that all inputs are increased equiproportionally but not
along the expansion path. This is equivalent in (7) to assumingthat
=n,since if all inputs grow at the same rate then (short run) costs
must also grow at that rate. Then (7) reduces to n (1 + ii+
lTd) 'ny.
Since + —B1nVC/B lnz, n (1 —B1nVC/B 1n)1n .Thenthe CCS
result is simply RTS =n1.In other words the CCS result should be
interpreted as a special case of (7), pertaining to the short run cost
elasticity. As indicated before, in order for it to relate to long run
*
scale economies, the assumption z =zmust be made.
4. The assumption of restricted cost minimizing behavior could be
examined by testing these cross—equation parameter constraints. Appelbaum
(1978) takes this approach in the context of an unrestricted costfunction.
5. To prove this note that it follows from (17) that plus T( —
= V0+ V1 —W—W'where W V1plim[P'(I01)UçT 1(1 0 E1)P]V0.
—1- iJ)'1—1
But p1im(Uc/T) () and = .Usingthe formula for a
partitionedinverseone obtains plim(U/T)(I 0E) (I 0). Now partition
P as P =(PP)t whereP contains instruments in P but not in P. Using
these results in the expression for W yields W =V1V11V0V0. SinceV0









6. This assumes, as stated, that the marginal investment in z
38lowers the (average) total -cost- curve. Thi8 will hold if the stock of z
is less than the static equilibrium level (since from (3) C —F+ r
and —F>rif z <z).Ifz >zthen the investment will raise
z
average total costs even though it reduces average variable costs. Then
regulatory lag induces negative rents and the private return falls short
of the opportunity cost. The conclusion which follows, however, holds
for both cases.
*
7.Letting 6 =6+ 4, —g,note that the equation for the IRR is
* 01 *
e(p + 6 )— F0/z0,while in equilibrium e (i + 6 )= r.This makes
it clear that departures of the shadow price from the market rental price
are reflections of the divergence between the IRR and the opportunity
cost of funds.
8. An alternative but less direct approach, suggested by Nadiri
and Schankerinan (1981b), Is to compute the IRR to the fixed factors and
then use them (instead of the opportunity cost of funds) to evaluate the
service prices of the fixed Inputs. Since a divergence between the shadow
and market rental prices reflects a deviation.of the IRR from the cost
of funds (see note 7), this approach is equivalent to the Berndt—Fuss
proposal.
9. It is worth noting that the specification in (25) is marginally
accepted at the 0.01 level when tested against the full translog form.
The computed 4is20.0, against a critical value of 20.1.
10. In the full translog specification, the long run AES take on
a very simple form If there is only one fixed factor——which arises
frequently in practice. Since this form does not utilize any of the
translog parameters which are omitted in (25), we state the result here.
39The derivation is lengthy and is available on request. Using the







where all variables are evaluated at their static
equilibrium values.
11. The instruments include the exogenous variables in the model
plus a time trend and its square, the level of output and its square, and
the stock of federal government capital. The empirical results without
instruments are not very different from those reported in the text.
12. The raw data used in this paper were provided by the Bell
System. These data are proprietary and inquiries regarding them should
be addressed to M. A. Chaudry at the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company.
13. The service price of capital is constructed as
r =
P1(1
—uz—w)(i+ 4)/(1 —u)+ T where P1 is the investment goods
deflator, u is the corporate income tax rate, w and z are the effective
rate of investment tax credit and the present value of depreciation
allowances, T is the indirect tax rate, i is a weighted average of debt
and equity costs, and 4isthe depreciation rate. These parameters are
constructed from Bell System data whenever possible.
14. We can illustrate the problem of disentangling "excess
capacity" and economies of scale which was discussed in Section 1. The
* —1
long run cost elasticity n =(1+), evaluatedat the static
equilibrium levels of capital and R&D, is n =0.55.If the observed
levels are used instead, we get the short run cost elasticity, n =0.45.
40Note that since n cn,-theincorrect use of observed levels would s £
overstate the degree of scale economies. This reflects the "excess
capacity" in capital reported in Table 4 (the underuse of R&D is
insufficient to counterbalance this effect).
15. Note two points. First, the values I —.055and g .07 are
the average values for the Bell System during the sample period. Second,
the parameter 6 can be interpreted as follows. From the discussion
preceding equation (21), Pt —= (CO/Zt)eót,so eót is the fraction
of the reduction in average cost which is not yet reflected in the price
of output t years later. The range of 6 used in the text, .25 <6<.35,
implies that 20—30 percent of the cost reduction Is still not reflected
in the price after five years.
16. For R&D the estimate of p varies inversely with 6 and 0 because
p >i.For example, a higher value of 6 means faster dissipation of the
positive rents which accrue to R&D. For capital, p varies directly with
6 and 0 because p <i.Also see note 6.
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